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RECENT CASES
FEDERAL COMMON LAW

In the recent case of Chase National Bank v. Mobile & 0. R. Co., 30 F.
Supp. 565 (S. D. Ala., 1939), the dogma that there is no federal common law
was unequivocally denounced. The court implied an intention on the part
of the framers of the constitution that the common law should be adopted insofar
as it was necessary to effect an interpretation of words and phrases used. It was
further declared that the procedure to be used, forms to be followed and rules to
be applied must, of necessity, since the framers promulgated no new ones, be
adopted from the common law.
It has frequently been declared that "there is no federal common law."
Erie R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), contains one of the most recent
statements to this effect. The case most frequently cited for this proposition is
See also Kendall v. United States, 12
Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591 (1834).
Pet. 524 (1838); Butcher v. Chesire R. Co., 125 U. S. 555 (1887).
The statement that there is no federal common law is often qualified by
recognition that in interpreting the constitution it is absolutely necessary to look
to common law. This substantiates the statement in the instant case. In Murray
v.Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 62 Fed. 24 (1894), the court stated that the adoption of the Constitution and the consequent creation of the national government
did not abrogate the common law previously existing. It was hefd that the
Supreme Court and all inferior courts were given thepower to apply common
law to all cases where it should be used. To the same effect, see New Jersey Nav.
Co. v. Merchants Bank, 6 Howard 344 (1848); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S.
465 (1886); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649 (1897); Kansas
v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 (1907); Ex parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87 (1925).
In the instant case the court enumerates several interpretive problems which
can be resolved only by reference to the common law. The Constitution, in Section 9 of Article 1, provides the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended and no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed. The
court declares that neither was known except at common law, and, since they are
not defined by the Constitution, it is presumed that the common law definition is
to control. Sections 1 and 2 give to the courts their powers but make no mention
as to what law or rules shall apply to the trials held by the courts. The court
states that the framers must have intended common law rules to apply or they
would have drawn up a set of new rules. Furthermore, how are "infamous
crime", "grand jury" and "due process of law", to be'defined, if not by reference
to the common law? The court also demonstrated, by examination of the Constitution and its amendments, that if any force and effect are going to be given
to many of its sections it will be necessary to utilize the common law.
Consideration of earlier authorities warrants the conclusion that there are
other instances where federal common law will be applied. It has been applied
to interstate transactions where no statute controls. In these cases the court lurported to apply the common law of the respective states but in fact adopted t eir
own federal common law. Western Union Tele. Co. v. McCall Pub. Co., 181
U. S.92 (1901); Interstate Commerce Comm. v. B. & 0. R. Co., 145 U. S. 263
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(1892). Erie R. Co. v. Tomkins, supra, has changed this situation, and now the
federal courts must apply the common law of the states as interpreted by the state
courts. In ex parte Grossman, supra, it was held that it is necessary to look to
the common law and the powers of the King of England to determine the pardon
powers of the President of the United States. It has also been declared that the
common law must be resorted to in defining rights in eminent domain proceedings. Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367 (1878). And, the court states in
Moore v. United States, 91 U. S. 270 (1878), that the Court of Claims is to
be governed by the common law rules of evidence.
If, as is stated in Erie R. Co. v. Tomkins, there is no federal common law,
then there can be no federal common law rules of conflict of laws, and state rules
must determine what law should govern. This question, whether there are federal common law conflict of laws rules or only state conflict of laws rules, has
arisen several times in lower federal courts and different results have been reached.
The existence of federal common law conflict of laws rules was recognized in
Dorman v. John Hancock Ins. Co., 25 F. Supp. 889 (S. D. Calif. 1939); N. Y.
Life Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 98 F. (2d) 950 (C. CA. 7th, 1938); Mutual Benefit
Ass'n. v. Bouman, 99 F. (2d) 856 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938). Contra, the following
cases, adopting the conflict of laws rule of the state in which the court is sitting.
Panko v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 24 F. Supp. 678 (N. D. N. Y., 1938); Monahan v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 26 F. Supp. 859 (W. D. Okla., 1939).
The foregoing illustrations would seem to establish beyond any doubt the
necessity for federal common law. As indicated, the Supreme Court has on
numerous occasions drawn exceptions to the well established contrary dogma.
The reiterations in tht instant case and the accompanying convincing analysis of
the subject are a refreshing and frank recognition of the existence of federal
common law and will warrant consideration in the future.
J. o. T.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw-FREEDOM

OF SPEECH-PEACEFUL PICKETING

An Alabama Statute provided that "any person who without just cause or
excuse goes near to or loiters about the premises or place of business of any other
for the purpose or intent of influencing or inducing others to adopt eny certain
enumerated courses of action, or who pickets th'e place of business of any other
person . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Held, unconstitutional as a restraint on freedom of speech and press. Thornhill v. Alabama, 60 S. Ct. 736
(1940).
Peaceful picketing for a lawful purpose not involving fraud, intimidation,
breach of the peace, or coercion is now generally held to be lawful. 16 R. C. L.
453; People v. Harris. 104 Col. 386, 91 P. (2d) 989, 122 A. L. R. 1034 (1939);
Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U. S. 468 (1937); E. M. Loew's Enterprises,
Inc. v. International Alliances of Theatrical Stage Employees. 125 Conn. 391, 6
A. (2d) 321 (1939); United Chain Theatres v. Philadelphia Moving Picture
M. 0. Union, 50 F. (2d) 189 (E. D. Pa. 1931); Schuster v. InternationalAssoc.
M. A. M. L., 293 111. App. 177, 12 N. E. (2d) 50 (1938); Stillwell Theatre v.
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Kaplan, 295 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932). The right to picket has been
based by many courts on the fact of statutory authorization. American Furniture
Co. v. 1. B. of T. C. & H. of A., 222 Wis. 338, 268 N. W. 250 (1936); New
Negro Alliance v. Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552 (1938); Lauf v. Shumer Co., 303
U. S. 323 (1938). Recently there has been a tendency to treat peaceful picketing
as an exercise of the privilege of freedom of spe-ech guarantees against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment. Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496
(1939); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939); Senn v. Tile Layers Union,
301 U. S. 468 (1937); Peoplev. Harris, 104 Colo. 386, 91 P. (2d) 989 (1939);
Note [1940] Wis. L. REV. 272, note 8. This latter view has been definitely
adopted by the court in the instant case. The distinction between these two views
is not merely of academic interest but of practical importance in that under the
latter view peaceful picketing is not subject to wide, indefinite restraint or absolute prohibition such as has recently been attempted by various state legislatures
and which could lawfully be imposed if the right rested completely on the fact of
statutory authorization. Note [1940] Wis. L. REV., 272.
Restrictions on the privilege of free speech in political and conscientious
activities have been permitted only in the interest of the safety of the state. Schenck
v. U. S., 249 U. S. 47 (1919); Frohwerk v. U. S., 249 U. S. 204 (1919); Debs
v. U. S., 249 U. S. 211 (1919); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937). It
has b'een suggested that where private rights are threatened a restraint might be
countenanced even though there was no threat to the safety of the state. Note
[1940] Wis. L. REV. 272; Abrams v. U. S., 250 U. S. 616 (1919). The opinion
in the instant case does not constitute a denial of this but does indicate that peaceful picketing without more does not fall within the situation contemplated by
this proposition, in that it holds that there is no "clear and present' danger to
private rights inherent in peaceful picketing and that any restriction by the state
on this right must be aimed "specifically at an encroachment of such rights." Just
what type of conduct may be said to encroach upon private rights and therefore
be enjoined is not indicated since the court was careful to base its decision on the
fact that the statute in question prohibited every conceivable type of conduct.
Neither does it appear from this opinion to what 'extent this right is to be limited
by the purpose for which it is exercised. The Court says that "dissemination
of information concerning the facts of a labor union dispute" is within the privilege of freedom of speech. The resulting problem as to when a dispute exists
remains unanswered. Can it be implied from this that picketing is lawful only
when there is an actual issue as to wages or working conditions, which was the
case before the court, or may it be indulged in merely for the purpose of acquiring
and maintaining a bargaining position? With regard to this question a recent
Pennsylvania decision shouldbe noted. The picketing there involved was for the
purpose of forcing an employer to induce his one emplovee to join the union. The
Court held that this purpose was unlawful. The fact that the equities of the case
were in favor of the employer apparently did not influence the Court. Flashnerv.
Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, Local 195,
37 Pa. D. & C. 337 (1939). See Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, 56 Atl. 327
(1903).
Even where a dispute does exist it seems that picketing should be
lawful only if directed at a settlement of the dispute.
L.G.
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CRIMINAL

LAW-INVOLUNTARY
MANSLAUGHTER-CAUSATIONUNLAWFUL ACT RESULTING IN DEATH

On trial on indictment charging defendant with involuntary manslaughter
b automobile, the court charged the jury, in substance, that guilt could be found
ifthe death occurred during the commission of the alleged unlawful act by defendant (which consisted of a violation of the provisions of the Motor Vehicle
Code as to the aim and intensity of lighting beams and speed of operation),
whether or not the death was the probable consequence of that act. Held, the
jury should have been instructed that such unlawful acts would not support a conviction unless death was the natural result or probable consequence thereof.
Commonwealth v. Aurick, 138 Pa. Super. 180, 10 At. 22 (1939).
There has never been in Pennsylvania a complete statutory definition of
"involuntary manslaughter." The earliest statute, Act of April 22, 1794 (3 Sm.
L. 186), as well as the Criminal Code of March 31, 1860, P. L. 382, section 79,
as amended by the Act of April 11, 1929, P. L. 513, section 1, 18 PURD. STATS.
(Pa.) § 2226, merely refers to "involuntary manslaughter, happening in consequence of an unlawful act." The courts, however, have clarified the meaning of
this term. Involuntary manslaughter consists of "the killing of another without
malice and unintentionally but in doing some unlawful act not amounting to a
felony nor naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm, or in negligently
doing some act lawful in itself, or by the negligent omission to perform a legal
duty.' Commonwealth v. Williams, 133 Pa. Super. 104, 1 A. (2d) 812 (1938);
Commonwealth v. Mayberry, 290 Pa. 195, 138 Atl. 686 (1927); Commonwealth
v. Micuso, 273 Pa. 474, 117 Atl. 211 (1922); Commonwealth v. Gable, 7 S.&
R. 422 (Pa. 1821).
The substantive connotation of the "unlawfulness" of the act upon which
the culpability for the unintentional homicide is predicated as well as the method
by which it may be determined are by no means settled. In some cases a distinction is made between acts which are malum in se and those which are merely
malum prohibitum. The former are regarded as supplying a criminal intent, and
as rendering the accused guilty, even thfough the killing was not the natural or
probable result of the act. Keller v. State, 155 Tenn. 633, 299 S. W. 803 (1927);
American Jurisprudence,Vol. 5, page 928; 99 A. L. R, 775. Although this distinction has been made in some lower court cases in Pennsylvania (Commonwealth
v. Lowans, 21 Pa. D. & C. 66, 1934), it has been said that there is no case in
Pennsylvania which holds, unqualifiedly, that to constitute involuntary manslaughter the unlawful act must be inalm in se and not merely nalurn prohibiunm.
In the
Commonwealth v. Samson, 130 Pa. Super. 65, 196 Atl. 564 (1938).
latest edition of Wharton on Criminal Law (1932) Vol. 1, section 157, note 10,
the difference adhered to in the earlier edition is discredited. There it is said that
the distinction taken in the old books between malum in se and malum prohibitum in this relation is now exploded.
The distinction between malum in se and malum prohibitum was not discussed in the instant case. Under the view taken by the court, "if the act is unlawful,-that is, is forbidden by law, illegal, contrary to law,-and the death of
another results as a consequence of it, it constitutes involuntary manslaughter."
Also see Commo nwealth v. Williams. 133 Pa. Super. 104, 108, 1 A. (2d) 812,
814 (1938); Commonwealth v. Ushka, 130 Pa. Super. 600, 604, 198 Atl. 465,
467 (1938); Commonwealth v. Gill, 120 Pa. Super. 22, 35, 182 Atl. 103, 108
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(1935). The mere violation of a statute will not sustain an involuntary manslaughter conviction where it appears that the death was not the natural result
or probable consequence of the unlawful act. Commonwealth' v. Aurick, supra.
In the instant case the defendant argued that, because the Act of 1929, supra,
amending the Act of 1860, supra, merely increased the penalty for the offense
although the entire section was reenacted, the court must consider the crime of
involuntary manslaughter as it existed in 1860, and that it could not be predicated
upon an act which was not unlawful at that time. The court said that the "unlawful act" element in the crime of involuntary manslaughter connotes no particular offense known to the common law or created by statute. It is merely what
it says, an act contrary to law. There is nothing inherent in this term, the court
said, which would require it to hold that the lesislature had in mind only acts
which were unlawful at that time. Although this point was not raised in such
cases as Commonwealth v. Ernesto et al, 93 Pa. Super. 339 (1928) and Commonwealth v. Mango, 101 Pa. Super. 385 (1930), they involved conviction for involuntary manslaughter where the death was in consequence of an act made unlawful by statute after 1860. See, also, Commonwealth ;v. Godshalk, 76 Pa.
Super. 500 (1921); Commonwealth v. Ochs, 91 Pa. Super. 528 (1927); Commonwealth v. Samson, 130 Pa. Super. 65, 196 Atl. 564 (1938); Commonwealth
v. Matteo, 130 Pa. Super. 524, 197 Atl. 787 (1938).
F. H,

CONSTITUTIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW-PRIVATE AcT REOPENING CASE BEFORE

TRIBUNAL-SEPARATION

OF POWERS-DUE

PROCESS

A private act of Congress directing the review of an order for compensation
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act after there
had been a final award and after the time for review had expired Was passed in
consequence of the fact that the testimony forming the basis for the finding that
the injured employee had fully recovered and had been completely compensated
turned out to be mistaken. The testimony originally taken was that of the company doctor. Held, the private act was valid, and not violative of due process
under the Fifth Amendment. Paramino Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 60 S. Ct. 600,
84 L. Ed. 545 (1940).
The court had presented to it the issues of separation of powers, equal protection of law, and due process in the matter of retroactive legislation.
From the lack of discussion of the retroactive feature of legislation of this
type in previously decided cases as well as in this case, we conclude that the question presented little difficulty to the Court.
The Court in its opinion resolved the questions of equal protection of laws
and the separation of powers doctrine in favor of the constitutionality of the act.
This is a case of first impression. Four state decisions on problems similar
to the one at hand have indicated rather clearly a contrary spirit. In Decker v.
Pouvailsmith Corp., 252 N. Y. 1, 168 N. E. 442 (1929) it was held that aprivate act of a similar type for the relief of one whose claim was barred by the New
York Compensation Act was invalid as denying the equal protection of the laws.
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In State v. IndustrialAccident Commission, 94 Mont. 386,23 P. (2d) 253 (1933)
a private act of legislature ordering the board to hear a particular case barred
under the Workmen's Compensation Act was declared void. See also Casieri's
Case, 286 Mass. 50, 190 N. E. 118 (1934), a case concurring under the Workmen's Compensation Act, similar on its facts, in which the statute was held invalid as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See also Roles Shingle Co. v.
Bergerson, 142 Ore. 131, 19 P. (2d) 94 (1933). The due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment is construed in the same manner as that of the Fifth.
Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884).
For this purpose the final adjudication of the employee's rights is not treated
as a judgment, as that term is used by the courts. ParaminoLumber Co. v. Afrshall, 84L. ld. 545, at p. 549. The Court there distinguishes a large number of
cases declaring invalid private acts which set aside judgments, granted new trials,
re-hearings, etc., on the ground that they affected judicial judgments and not administrative orders. See for example, Dorsey v. Dorsey, 37 Md. 64 (1872); De
Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18 (i850); Taylor v. Place, 4 R. 1. 324 (1856).
Dicta in one or two of the very numerous cases on this point hint that such an act
would be held valid in the presence of special equities. This is 'especially true of
the Maryland decisions. Dorsey v. Dorsey, supra.
Mr. Justice Reed says in the instant case that this legislation is not "an excursion by the Congress into the judicial function". An interesting dictum is
presented in the opinion in this statement: "The state cases cited by the appellants
on the question of the invasion of judicial authority involve statutes affecting
judicial judgments rather than administrative orders and are therefore inapplicable" citing cases. This statement gives rise to the question of whether this distinction is based upon the tribunal in which the order was made. If so, it would
seem that the finality of administrative orders is subject to another qualification
tending ultimately to remove all finality. Together with the case of Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1931), which held that an administrative order is always
subject to review by the courts on "constitutional facts," whatever they may be,
the Paramino case further emasculates this aspect of an administrative order under
th'e Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.
C. W. G.

TAXATION-ESTATE

TAx-LIFE

INSURANCE--THIRD BAILEY CASE

Between 1925 and 1929 decedent took out policies of insurance on his own
life. In 1932 he :assigned the policies to his wife and son as life owners, the
survivor to be entitled to the proceeds at decedent's death. The assignment provided, however, that should both assignees predecease decedent, latter would become life owner and the proceeds payable to his executors, administrators, and
assigns. Both assignees survived Jecedent. Held, proceeds of the policies so
assigned are properly included in decedent's gross estate for purposes of taxation
under § 302 (g) of the Revenue Act of 1924 (Now § 811 of the Revenue Code
of 1939, 53 Stat. 120, 26 U. S. C. A. 811). Bailey v. U. S., 31 F. Supp. 778
(Ct. Cl., 1940).
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In the search for means of conferring benefits to take effect after the death of
a donor but without subjecting the gift to the incidents of testamentary disposition.
many benefactors have resorted to inter vivos transfers of life insurance policies.
The plan works thus: A, wanting to make provision for his son, B, takes out a
policy of insurance on his own life. Thereafter he makes an assignment of the
policy to B, who becomes the owner and entitled to the proceeds upon A's death.
Use of this scheme is founded upon the belief that an irrevocable assignment
of the type outlined will be effective to avoid inclusion of the proceeds in insured's
gross estate for estate tax purposes, and to take advantage of the substantial difference between the estate tax and the gift tax. See Note (1939) 49 Yale L. 1. 126
(Discussing such savings in detail). This belief is the result of a sizeable body of
authority to the effect that if no incidents of ownership are retained by decedent no
estate tax levy can be made. This is the interpretation of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Regulations 80, Article 25 (1934) (incidents of ownership include
right of insured or his estate to economic benefits of the policy, to assign it, revoke
an assignment, pledge it for a loan, or to obtain a loan from the insurer against
the surrender value, etc.).
An earlier interpretation by the Commissioner made payment of premiums
by the insured an important element of taxability under § 302 (g). A line of
cases adopted the same view. Lang v. Comm'r, 304 U. S. 264 (1938); Wilson v.
Crooks, 52 F. (2d) 692 (W. D., Md., 1931); Helvering v. Reybine, 83 F. (2d)
215 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1936); Nelson v. Comm'r, 101 F. (2d) 568 (C. C. A. 8th,
1939). See also Note (1937) 32 Ill. L. Rev. 223.
Aside from this element, however, it has been consistently held that unless
some incident of ownership is retained by the insured, there is no transfer at death
to justify imposition of the estate tax. Tyler v. U. S., 281 U. S. 497 (1930);
Bingham v. U. S., 296 U. S. 211 (1935); Industrial Tr. Co. v. U. S., 296 U. S.
220 (1935);Heinerv. Grandin (C. C. A. 3rd, 1930) 44 F. (2d) 141, cert. denied
286 U. S. 561 (1932); Anthracite Tr. Co. v. Phillips, 49 F. (2d) 910 (M. D.
Pa. 1931); Levy v. Comm'r, 65 F. (2d) 412 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1933); McKelvy v.
Comm'r, 82 F. (2d) 395 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1936). See also Note (1938) 118
A. L. R. 325, 326, and Paul, "Life Insurance and the Federal Estate Tax", 52
Harv. L. Rev. 1037 (1939).
Under these cases an irrevocable assignment was deemed to divest all the socalled incidents of ownership sufficiently to prevent a taxable transfer at death
even though a reversionary interest remained in the insured by virtue of a provision that he or his estate get the benefits of the policy should the assignee predecease him. Industrial Tr. Co. v. U. S., supra.
So far as the assignements here discussed are concerned the same exemptions
have been granted whether the transfer was completed before or after promulgation of § 302 (g). Ballard v. Helburn, 85 F. (2d) 613 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936);
Walker v. U. S., 83 F. (2d) 103 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936); Boswell v. Comm'r, 37
B. T. A. 970 (1938).
First Bailey case, 27 F. Supp. 617 (Ct. Cl., 1939). On a finding that insured
paid the premiums after the assignment, the Court held that the proceeds were
subject to the estate tax, though admitting that its holding was not in accord with
Walker v. U. S., Helburn v. Ballard, and Boswell v. Comnm'r., all supra. Under
prior cases the irrevocable transfer would have been sufficient to exempt the roceeds under § 302 (g). See Friedland, "The Bailey Case" (1939) 17 Tax
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Magazine 512; Foosaner, "Some of the Tax Problems in Life Insurance", 63
N. 1. L. f. 21; Note (1939) 49 Yale L. 1. 126; (1939) 13 Temple L. Q. 538.
Second Bailey case, Upon a showing that assignee rather than insured paid
the premiums subsequent to the assignment, the former opinion was modified and
tax refunded. 30 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl., 1939). The Court pointed out, however,
that its prior decision was not reversed but merely modified to exclude cases in
which the assignee paid the premiums. As to other cases, the proceeds of irrevocably assigned policies were apparently still regarded as includible in gross
estate. See Foosaner, "Some of the Tax Problems, in Life Insurance", supra; C. C.
H., 401 Fed. Tax Service § 0373 (Note).
Then came Helvering v. Hallock, 308 U. S.
(1940), 8 U. S. L, Week 192,
in which it was held there was a sufficient transfer at death to justify a levy under
§ 302 (c), even though decedent's interest had been irrevocably transferred,
where he had retained a possibility of reverter. See Surrey, "Scope and Effect of
Treasury Regulations Under the Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes" (1940) 88 U. of
Pa. L. Rev. 556, 579 et seq.
Third Bailey case. In its last decision the Court reaches the result of its first
opinion, but this time on the authority of Helvering v. Hallock, taxability being
eemed to arise out of the extinguishment at insured's death of the possibility of
reverter retained after assignment.
Obviously, these cases are not the last word as regards the application of
§ 302 (g) to assignments of life insurance policies. Generalization based upon
inter vivos assignment will not escape the estate tax if (1) assignor continues to
pay premiums thereafter, or (2) there is a possibility of reverter to assignor upon
the prior death of assignee. There would seem to be no authority saying that an
irrevocable assignment, the beneficiary payin the remiums thereafter, and with
no possibility of reverter to the assignor, will not te exempt.
R. H. G.

